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INTRODUCTION
During the past term, the Supreme Court decided three cases involving
constitutional constraints upon law enforcement. Kentucky v. King' raised a
substantive Fourth Amendment law issue-whether officers may conduct
warrantless searches based on exigent circumstances of their own creation. The
pro-law enforcement outcome was hardly unpredictable, but the extremity of the
Court's position and its near unanimity were somewhat surprising. Eight Justices
decided that the cardinal search warrant requirement is suspended when officers
search a home or other private place based on exigency-such as potential
evidence destruction-as long as "the police did not create the exigency by
engaging or threatening to engage in conduct that violates the Fourth
Amendment." 2 With the aim of avoiding the constitutional safeguard against their
excess zeal or biased judgments, officers may apparently engage in any other kind
of instigative conduct and may then rely upon the responses they generate.'
In JD.B. v. North Carolina,4 a slender majority reached an even more
surprising-and pro-defense--conclusion. Five Justices ruled that age does matter
in Miranda custody determinations. Officers and judges must consider the
psychological impact of youth in determining whether a reasonable person below
eighteen would feel subjected to a 'restraint on freedom of movement of the
degree associated with formal arrest."' 6 Consequently, in a particular case, a child
might be entitled to bar from trial a confession given without Miranda warnings
even though prosecutors could introduce an unwarned confession from an adult
subjected to an identical interrogation atmosphere.
. Edward F. Howrey Professor of Law, University of Iowa College of Law. I am grateful to
the University of Iowa College of Law for the summer research funding to complete this essay. I am
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I Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849 (2011).
2 Id. at 1858.
One can only wonder whether officers may act upon exigencies generated by conduct that
violates other constitutional provisions-physical torture, for example.
4 J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011).
' Id. at 2399, 2406.
6 Id. at 2402 (quoting Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995) (internal quotation
marks, alteration, and footnote omitted)).
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My task here is to assess the significance of Davis v. United States, the third
of the trilogy of 2010 Term criminal procedure opinions. Unlike the rulings in
King and J.D.B., the outcome of Davis was eminently predictable, virtually devoid
of surprises.8 The issue was whether evidence obtained during an unconstitutional
vehicle search was subject to exclusion when, at the time of the search, a
governing court of appeals decision deemed that search consistent with the Fourth
Amendment.9 Six Justices concluded that "searches conducted in objectively
reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent are not subject to the
exclusionary rule."' 0 The holding that the "exclusionary rule does not apply"" in
those circumstances crafted another, quite circumscribed, "good faith" exception to
the general prohibition of unconstitutionally obtained evidence. Evidence that
officers acquire as a result of an unreasonable search or seizure is admissible if an
appellate court with authority over the jurisdiction had previously declared a
search or seizure of that sort reasonable. The evidentiary gains of unconstitutional
conduct will be suppressed only in the rare, unlikely case that it was objectively
unreasonable to believe that the erroneous appellate ruling was a valid Fourth
Amendment interpretation.'2
Recent encounters between the Roberts Court and the exclusionary rule had
led me to expect that the Court would announce another novel and previously
unimagined restriction on the suppression remedy. That was not the case. Davis'
addition of another variety of good faith exception to the exclusionary rule was a
virtually inevitable extension of the prior doctrine based on familiar themes.
Despite the absence of new insights into the Weeks-Mapp rule, however, Davis is
not insignificant. The opinion confirms the advent of a new era of exclusionary
rule development, reflecting the Roberts Court's commitment to a revolutionary,
and stifling, revision of the Fourth Amendment bar to illegally obtained evidence.
The reasons for my assessment are set forth in the discussion that follows.
The discussion begins with a summary of Davis followed by a brief review of the
exclusion doctrine's history. Next, I describe the sea change that began soon after
the Roberts era began, recounting the rulings in Hudson v. Michigan and Herring
v. United States that laid a foundation for Davis, and highlighting the themes,
Davis, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011).
8 Perhaps the only surprise was new Justice Kagan's unqualified support for the majority
opinion.
9 Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2423.
10 Id. at 2423-24. A seventh Justice agreed that the exclusionary rule does not apply if
binding appellate precedent provides specific authorization for the search that violates the Fourth
Amendment. See id. at 2435. (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment).
" Id. at 2434.
12 It seems nearly inconceivable that an appellate ruling will be so far from the constitutional
mark that it is unreasonable to believe that it is correct. Moreover, objective unreasonableness
dictates suppression only under the narrow holding of Davis. Under the opinion's broader dictum,
evidence is admissible even if officers negligently believe that an appellate precedent is valid. See
infra, notes 103-08, 121-22 and accompanying text.
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attitudes, and trends evident in these three opinions. Finally, I offer reflections on
the impact of the revolutionary changes that have occurred.
I. THE SIMPLE CASE OF WILLIE DAVIS
In 2007, Alabama police officers arrested both the driver of a vehicle, Stella
Owens, for driving while intoxicated, and a passenger, Willie Davis, for providing
a false name.' 3 The two handcuffed arrestees were placed in the back seats of
patrol cars.14 While searching Owens's vehicle, officers found a revolver inside
Davis's jacket pocket. 5  Davis was subsequently indicted for "possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon."' 6 He moved to suppress the revolver from his trial,
acknowledging that the vehicle search was authorized by Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals precedent.' 7 Consistent with the majority view, that court had determined
that New York v. Belton'8 "establish[ed] a bright-line rule authorizing substantially
contemporaneous vehicle searches incident to the arrests of recent occupants." 9
The trial court denied suppression, and Davis was convicted.20
While the case was on appeal, the Supreme Court decided in Arizona v.
Gan?' that Belton restricted the scope of searches incident to arrest more narrowly
than the Eleventh Circuit's bright-line rule.22 Under Gant, the Fourth Amendment
permits the search of a passenger compartment incident to a recent occupant's
arrest only "(1) if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the vehicle during the
search, or (2) if the police have reason to believe that the vehicle contains
'evidence relevant to the crime of arrest."' 23 The Court of Appeals then concluded
that under "Gant's new rule" the vehicle search had violated the Fourth
Amendment, but held that, in light of the binding precedent extant at the time of
the search, the deterrent purposes of the exclusionary rule did not dictate
24
suppression. The appellate court "therefore declined to apply the exclusionary
rule and affirmed Davis's conviction."25 The Supreme Court granted Davis's
" Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2425.
14 id
15 id
16 Id. at 2425-26.
17 Id. at 2426.
18 New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
1 Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2426.
20 id
21 Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
22 Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2425-26.
23 Id. at 2425.
24 Id. at 2426. The unconstitutionality of the vehicle search is debatable. The arrest of Owens
for driving under the influence might well have justified the search under the second prong of Gant's
holding.
25 id
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petition for a writ of certiorari.26
Six Justices joined an opinion affirming the Eleventh Circuit's logic and
"hold[ing] that searches conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding
appellate precedent are not subject to the exclusionary rule."2 The nuances of
Justice Alito's supporting reasoning and other pertinent aspects of the opinion are
discussed and analyzed later. For now, suffice it to say that the majority found this
new good faith variant entirely consistent with deterrent objectives and with the
cost-benefit balance that governs exclusionary rule analysis.28
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT EXCLUSIONARY RULE
The Court first recognized the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule in a case
decided nearly a century ago in Weeks v. United States.29 Because the Fourth
Amendment applies only to the federal government, the Weeks rule governed only
in federal courts. Exactly half a century ago, in Mapp v. Ohio, 30 the Court held
that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause-which binds states-
included not only the right to privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment, but also
the bar to evidence obtained in violation of that right. Since Mapp, state courts
have been bound by a suppression doctrine identical to the federal exclusionary
rule. Both limit prosecutors' abilities to prove guilt in identical ways.
Weeks and Mapp envisioned evidentiary exclusion as an integral part of the
guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. 31 Both saw the introduction
of illegally obtained evidence as a deprivation of a defendant's constitutional
right.32 Mapp also characterized exclusion as a "constitutionally required . . .
deterrent safeguard" essential to preventing future violations of the right to security
against unreasonable searches and seizures. In addition, the Mapp majority relied
on "the imperative of judicial integrity."34 The exclusionary rule shielded judges
from the taint of permitting law enforcers to reap courtroom profit from
26 id
" Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2423-24. Justice Sotomayor agreed that "where 'binding appellate
precedent specifically authorize[d] a particular police practice, . . . the exclusionary rule does not
apply." Id. at 2435 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasis in original). As a result,
she agreed that suppression was unjustified in Davis.
28 The majority rejected the argument that retroactivity principles required a holding that the
vehicle search was unconstitutional and that the evidence found was barred. Id. at 2430-32.
29 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The centennial of Weeks is but three years
away.
30 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
31 See JAMES J. TOMKovICz, CONSTITUTIONAL ExcLUSION: THE RULES, RIGHTS, AND REMEDIES
THAT STRIKE THE BALANCE BETWEEN FREEDOM AND ORDER 6, 16, 23-24 (2006). Weeks was a
unanimous decision. Mapp, however, had bare majority support.
3 See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655-56; Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398.
* Mapp, 367 U.S. at 648.
34 Id. at 659.
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unconstitutional conduct.
The recognition that states had to exclude illegally-secured evidence was the
major exclusionary rule achievement of the Warren Court. During the remainder
of the 1960s, while issuing a number of landmark criminal procedure rulings, the
Warren Court paid little attention to the contours of the exclusion doctrine.
Although it may have furnished a foundation for later erosion of the suppression
sanction by emphasizing the future-oriented deterrent purpose in some opinions,36
the Warren Court never abandoned the view that exclusion is a constitutional right
belonging to the individual defendant on trial, and never foreswore the judicial
integrity rationale.
The exclusionary rule sustained considerable erosion during the thirty-seven
years of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts. A fundamentally different
understanding of the justification for suppression facilitated the anti-suppression
agenda. In a major ruling just five years after the Warren era ended, the Court
announced that exclusion is "a judicially created remedy" and not "a personal
constitutional right" of the accused.3 9  The "prime purpose is to deter future
unlawful police conduct," thereby enforcing the only Fourth Amendment right-
out-of-court security against unreasonable searches and seizures.40 This revision of
the rationales for exclusion yielded a cost-benefit analysis that involves weighing
deterrent gains against social costs. In several cases, the Burger and Rehnquist
Courts employed this balancing analysis to resolve exclusion claims. In all but a
few, the result was diminution of the suppression sanction.
For the most part, exclusionary rule erosion during the last three decades of
3 The Warren Court contributed little to the development of suppression law. One opinion
applied the "attenuation" exception that predated Mapp by twenty-two years. See Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). Two others addressed whether defendants had "standing" to
assert exclusion-another pre-Mapp limitation. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969);
Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968). The Court discussed three previously unaddressed issues:
extending suppression to a nominally civil forfeiture proceeding with similarities to a criminal
prosecution, see One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965); refusing to apply
Mapp retroactively to cases final on appeal at the time Mapp was decided, see Linkletter v. Walker,
381 U.S. 618 (1965); and ruling that an accused's testimony at a suppression hearing to establish
standing was inadmissible to prove his guilt at trial, see Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377
(1968).
3 See Alderman, 394 U.S. at 174-75; Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 633, 635-37.
37 A year before Earl Warren's departure, the Court stressed that exclusion is a defendant's
personal constitutional right and relied on that premise to bar suppression hearing testimony from
trial. See Simmons, 390 U.S. at 389, 394.
38 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1968) (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S.
206, 222 (1960)) (asserting, one year before Earl Warren left the Court, that "[tihe [exclusionary] rule
also serves another vital function-'the imperative of judicial integrity'); see also Linkletter, 381
U.S. at 635 (acknowledging that one reason Mapp concluded that states had to adhere to the
exclusionary rule was that the admission "of illegal evidence .. . violate[d] 'the imperative of judicial
integrity"').
3 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
40 Id. at 347.
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the twentieth century occurred within the confines of extant limitations on
suppression. Several opinions tightened the "standing" requirement.41 Two
restrictively applied the core "but-for" causation demand.42 One construed the
longstanding "independent source" doctrine generously,43 and another interpreted
the acknowledged attenuation exception expansively." One decision increased the
prosecution's ability to impeach defendants with illegally obtained evidence.45
There were only a few "novel" restrictions: a consistent refusal to extend
suppression beyond criminal trials, 46 a bar to exclusionary rule claims in habeas
corpus challenges,47 and, perhaps most significantly, an inevitable discovery
exception, 8 and three varieties of good faith exceptions. Only occasional pro
exclusion rulings punctuated the campaign against suppression.50 Generally, the
exclusionary rule shrank as a result of a number of limited constraints announced
in narrow holdings. By the end of the Rehnquist era, the cumulative damage was
substantial. Still, the rule's core was intact, and there were no signs of imminent
overthrow.5 1 As the new millennium dawned, there was reason to believe that the
Court might have achieved equilibrium. When the baton passed to John Roberts,
however, everything changed. Before long, and without warning, revolution was
in the air.
III. THE ROBERTS REVOLUTION: RHETORICAL AND DOCTRINAL ASSAULTS ON
THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
In the six terms since the arrival of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, the
Court has rendered three significant exclusionary opinions in three unassuming
cases. In each, the Court granted a defendant's petition for review after a lower
41 See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998); United States v. Padilla, 508 U.S. 77 (1993);
Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980); United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980); United
States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
42 See New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14 (1990); United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463 (1980).
43 See Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 (1988).
4 See United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978).
4s See United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980).
46 See Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357 (1998) (exclusionary rule
inapplicable to parole revocation hearing); Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Lopez-Mendoza,
468 U.S. 1032 (1984) (suppression not applicable to civil deportation proceeding); Calandra, 414
U.S. 338 (1974) (exclusion not required from grand jury proceeding).
47 See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
48 See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984). Although Nix involved Sixth Amendment
suppression, the doctrine clearly applies to the Fourth Amendment rule.
49 See Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987);
Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
50 See Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990); James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307 (1990); Brown
v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
5 At this point, there were no Justices advocating the overthrow of Weeks-Mapp.
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court had refused to suppress, then found the lower court ruling correct and
affirmed admission of the contested evidence. None of the cases involved a need
to remedy an exclusionary rule error. Moreover, while the technical holding in
each is quite narrow, all three opinions relied on premises posing major threats to
the exclusionary rule's health, providing potent evidence of a determination to
revolutionize the law by dramatically curtailing, perhaps even abrogating, the
Weeks-Mapp doctrine. In this part, I review the damage already done by Hudson
v. Michigan52 and Herring v. United States" before detailing how Davis v. United
States furthered the program.
A. Hudson v. Michigan
Hudson involved a conceded violation of the knock-and-announce principle.5 4
Officers entered a home pursuant to a search warrant for drugs and firearms
prematurely-i.e., without waiting the reasonable time required to allow occupants
to respond." The sole question was whether the drugs and firearm found upon
entry had to be excluded from trial.5 6 Because Michigan Supreme Court precedent
held that evidence discovered after knock-and-announce violations was admissible
under the inevitable discovery exception, the state courts denied suppression.
Hudson was convicted of drug possession. 8
The Supreme Court heard oral arguments in early January 2006. Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor, who had submitted a letter of retirement to the President in
July of 2005, participated. The tenor and content of the arguments indicated an
inclination to rule on the narrow inevitable discovery principle supporting
Michigan's resolution.59  Three weeks later, however, Justice Samuel Alito
supplanted Justice O'Connor, and in mid-April, the Court scheduled reargument.60
During reargument in May, there were signs that the Court might use Hudson as a
vehicle for a more general examination of the vitality of the exclusion doctrine.6
In an opinion authored by Justice Scalia and joined by four other Justices, the
Court starkly held that suppression is never available for knock-and-announce
52 Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006).
5 Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009).
54 Hudson, 547 U.S. at 590.
s Id. at 588.
56 Id. at 590.
s Id. at 588-89.
Id. at 589.
s9 See David A. Moran, Waiting for the Other Shoe: Hudson and the Precarious State of
Mapp, 93 IOWA L. REv. 1725, 1730 (2008). According to Professor Moran, who argued on Hudson's
behalf, "[i]t seemed clear . .. that a majority . . ., including ... Justice ... O'Connor, was prepared"
to hold that evidence acquired "as a result of knock-and-announce violations" had to be excluded. Id.
6 Id. at 1731.
61 See id. at 1732.
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requirement violations.62 This conclusion rested not on Michigan's narrow,
inevitable discovery foundation, but, instead, on three independent and distinct
doctrinal pylons, each of which threatened broader damage to the suppression
sanction.
Justice Scalia recited the familiar suppression principle that demands a but-for
causal connection between an illegality and the acquisition of evidence, then
applied that principle in Hudson after severing the unreasonable entry from the
ensuing warranted search." By viewing the entry and search as separate
constitutional events, the majority was able to conclude that there was no causal
connection between the knock-and-announce violation and the acquisition of the
evidence inside Hudson's home. The lack of a but-for link precluded
65
suppression.
The Court next reasoned that even if there had been a causal connection, the
"attenuation" exception to the exclusionary rule prevented exclusion for knock-
and-announce violations.6 6  This attenuation doctrine, however, bore no
resemblance to the traditional attenuation exception, which only permits the
admission of derivative evidence with remote connections to
unconstitutionalities.6 7 The new branch of attenuation authorized the introduction
of all primary and derivative evidence acquired as a result of knock-and-announce
violations because suppression would not serve the interests protected by the
knock-and-announce rule. Moreover, it appeared to rest on the bizarre,
unprecedented premise that suppression aims to somehow reconceal evidence
uncovered in violation of a constitutional safeguard whose purpose is to shield
private information from government eyes and makes sense only if one ignores the
deterrent logic that has long ruled the suppression roost.69 It has the potential for
considerable expansion, precluding suppression for any Fourth Amendment
demand that serves an interest other than shielding information from government
scrutiny.70
Finally, the Court reasoned that even if there was "unattenuated causation"
between a knock-and-announce violation and the acquisition of evidence,
suppression is inappropriate because costs always exceed benefits." The Court
had never before engaged in individualized cost-benefit balancing based on a
62 Hudson, 547 U.S. at 594, 599.
63 For a thorough discussion of Hudson's premises and implications, see James J. Tomkovicz,
Hudson v. Michigan and the Future ofFourth Amendment Exclusion, 93 IowA L. REv. 1819 (2008).
64 See id. at 1851.
65 Hudson, 547 U.S. at 592.
66 Id. at 592-93.
67 See Tomkovicz, supra note 63, at 1863.
61 Hudson, 547 U.S. at 594.
69. See id. at 593.
70 See Tomkovicz, supra note 63, at 1864-65.
7n Hudson, 547 U.S. at 594, 599.
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particular type of Fourth Amendment wrong. Because a number of the dubious
reasons relied upon in assessing the knock-and-announce cost-benefit balance are
quite capable of extension to other improprieties, this third doctrinal maneuver
could also erode suppression in other Fourth Amendment contexts.72
Hudson fired the first shots in the revolution by positing three independent-
and questionable-doctrinal bases for eliminating exclusion for knock-and-
announce violations when a simple, relatively conventional basis for rejecting
suppression-the inevitable discovery doctrine-could have sufficed. The
majority was surely aware of the damaging potential these doctrinal options
harbored. It seems fair to conclude that Justice Scalia designed the three
alternatives with the intent that they be employed to further erode the suppression
remedy.
Verbal assaults on the exclusionary rule were en vogue long before 2006.
Burger and Rehnquist Court exclusionary rule opinions evinced an exceedingly
stingy attitude toward suppression. Hudson, however, escalated the rhetoric to
new heights. Justice Scalia deemed evidentiary suppression a "massive" and
"incongruent remedy"73 that had "always been" the Court's "last resort."74
Moreover, it not only set "the guilty free," it also set "the dangerous at large."7 5
Perhaps the most significant suggestions were those alleging that earlier opinions,
like Mapp, had not been circumspect in depicting exclusion and others indicating
that the Mapp rule was the product of another era, that times and conditions had
changed, and that the bar to probative evidence was not necessary or justifiable as
it once might have been. Hudson oozed antipathy toward exclusion, suggesting
that interment was a genuine possibility.77
B. Herring v. United States
Two terms later, Herring v. United States 8 arrived. Officers in one
jurisdiction had negligently failed to purge a recalled arrest warrant from their
database.79  A report by that jurisdiction that there was an active warrant led
72 For thorough discussion of the novel facets of this portion of the majority's reasoning and
of its damaging potential, see Tomkovicz, supra note 63, at 1878-80.
7 Hudson, 547 U.S. at 595.
7 Idat591.
7 Id.; see also id. at 595 (noting that a cost is that suppression runs "the risk of releasing
dangerous criminals into society").
76 See id. at 597-99.
7 See Tomkovicz, supra note 63, at 1846-47. Justice Kennedy's mixed messages provided
reason to wonder whether there was sufficient support for the revolutionary approach implicit in
Hudson's doctrinal and rhetorical offensives. See id. at 1848-49.
7 Herring, 555 U.S. 135 (2009). For a thorough and incisive critique of the opinion, see
Wayne R. LaFave, The Smell of Herring: The Supreme Court's Latest Assault on the Exclusionary
Rule, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLoGY 757 (2009).
7 Herring, 555 U.S. at 138.
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officers from another jurisdiction to arrest Herring.so A vehicle search incident to
the arrest produced contraband and a weapon.8' The trial court denied suppression
and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the "arresting officers . . . 'were
entirely innocent of any wrongdoing or carelessness,"' and holding that "the
evidence was . . . admissible under the good-faith rule."8 2 The appellate court
relied upon the fact that the database "error was merely negligent and [was]
attenuated from the arrest."83  The narrow issue was whether the good faith
exception extended to negligent record-keeping errors by law enforcement in one
jurisdiction and objectively reasonable reliance on the erroneous record by officers
in another jurisdiction.
Two and a half years after Hudson, a five-Justice majority provided further
evidence of the Roberts Court's revolutionary mood. The Court affirmed the
Eleventh Circuit's logic and conclusion, deeming exclusion inappropriate when
there was nothing more than "isolated negligence attenuated from the arrest"" and
when other officers acted in "objectively reasonable reliance" on the erroneous
report.8 ' This constituted an unprecedented extension of the good -faith doctrine to
cases involving not only law enforcement error but also objectively unreasonable
(that is, negligent) law enforcement error. Nonetheless, because its holding was
exceedingly limited-authorizing the admission of evidence only when a negligent
error is "attenuated" from an arrest and when arresting officers lack fault 86-
Herring did not impose a dramatic, or particularly threatening, restriction upon
suppression.
The Herring majority, however, was not content merely to resolve this narrow
issue. Significantly, and quite broadly, Chief Justice Roberts announced that "the
question [of suppression] turns on the culpability of the police and the potential of
exclusion to deter wrongful police conduct,"87 that "the extent to which the
exclusionary rule is justified by ... deterrence principles varies with the culpability
of the law enforcement conduct,"88 that "[t]o trigger the exclusionary rule, police
conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it,
and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice
system,"89 and, ultimately, that "the exclusionary rule serves to deter [only]
deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some circumstances
so Id. at 137.
81 id
81 Id at 138-39.
83 id
8 Id at 137.
8s Id. at 146.
86 Id at 137, 139-40.
87 Id. at 137 (emphasis added).
88 Id. at 143 (emphasis added).
89 Id. at 144 (emphasis added).
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recurring or systemic negligence."90 Because no officer in Herring had culpability
rising to the requisite level-the only fault being a nonrecurring, negligent record-
keeping error-"any marginal deterrence" that might result from suppression could
"not 'pay its way"'9 and "'the extreme sanction of exclusion"' was unjustified.92
Herring and Hudson have similarities. Both involved limited issues resolved
properly by lower courts followed by Supreme Court affirmances that inflicted
more damage upon the exclusionary rule than necessary. Herring, however, was
nearly devoid of the pejorative rhetorical flourishes strewn throughout Hudson.93
More important, Herring did not tread in any of Hudson's revolutionary doctrinal
footsteps. The majority opted for a different, and quite devastating, analytical tack,
opening up a new front in the effort to depose-or at least render impotent-the
Weeks-Mapp doctrine.
After defining a new variety of good faith exception, the Court identified a
basic threshold requirement for operation of the exclusionary rule, a "culpability"
demand that, like "standing" and "but-for" causation, guards the suppression
gate.94  This "fault" criterion bars any possibility of exclusion-and renders
exceptions unnecessary-unless officers are, at a minimum, grossly or recurrently
negligent.95 In essence, Herring installed a novel filter for exclusionary rule
claims, narrowing further the neck through which they must pass. Moreover, it
rendered quite superfluous every variety of good faith doctrine previously
announced. To qualify for the good faith exception, officers must act in
objectively reasonable reliance upon constitutional missteps of others, but,
according to Herring's culpability criterion, the exclusionary rule is not triggered
even when officers are objectively unreasonable in relying on others' errors.
Merely negligent or careless Fourth Amendment violations by officers cannot
justify suppression.
9 Id. (emphasis added).
91 Id. at 147-48 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 907-08 n.6 (1984)).
92 Id. at 140 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 916).
9 The Court did repeat Hudson's assertion that "exclusion 'has always been our last resort,
not our first impulse,"' id at 140 (quoting Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006)), but
otherwise the Herring Court resisted the urge to heap more rhetorical tar upon the suppression
doctrine.
' Id. at 143-44.
9 The Court seemed a bit equivocal about whether recurrent negligence-i.e., a pattern of
careless errors or carelessness that is systemic-would suffice. See id. at 144 (asserting that "in some
circumstances" the "exclusionary rule serves to deter ... recurring or systemic negligence"); id. at
146 (stating that "systemic errors ... might" support a recklessness finding).
96 Unlike the revolutionary doctrinal premises in Hudson, Herring's novel constriction of
suppression provoked not a whisper of resistance from Justice Kennedy, no hint that he found this
revision of the exclusionary rule troubling. Herring's culpability threshold attracted the unqualified
support of five Justices.
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C. Davis v. United States
Two and a half years later, the Court decided Davis v. United States.9 7 As
noted, Davis held that if officers acquire evidence by means of an unreasonable
search or seizure, but have reasonably relied upon binding appellate precedent,
suppression is inappropriate.98 This good faith exception for Fourth Amendment
errors by judges and faultless law enforcement conduct-i.e., officers lacking even
negligence-was consistent with precedent.99 Relying on key premises supporting
United States v. Leon-the pillar on which all good faith doctrines stand-the
majority reasoned that "when binding appellate precedent specifically authorizes a
particular police practice," an officer who engages in the sanctioned practice "does
no more than 'ac[t] as a reasonable officer would and should act' under the
circumstances."'" In such a case, exclusion would only serve to "deter . . .
conscientious police work" and would "discourage the officer from 'do[ing] his
duty."' 0 ' The refusal to suppress evidence obtained "during a search conducted in
reasonable reliance on binding precedent," despite a later determination that the
search was unconstitutional, followed from the Court's prior recognition that "the
harsh sanction of exclusion 'should not be applied to deter objectively reasonable
law enforcement activity."" 02 In sum, the narrow holding of Davis, which does
minimal damage to the suppression remedy, was hardly unpredictable, and far
from revolutionary.
As in Hudson and Herring, however, Davis eschewed the straight and narrow
path. Venturing well beyond what was necessary to resolve the case, Justice Alito
proffered another basis for denying suppression in cases like Davis. This
alternative, much broader rationale confirmed the Roberts Court's determination to
radically reform the exclusionary rule by severely limiting its presumptive reach.'o3
The Davis majority forcefully reaffirmed Herring's culpability threshold,
asserting that "the deterrent value of exclusion is strong and tends to outweigh the
resulting costs" only when officers "exhibit 'deliberate,' 'reckless,' or 'grossly
negligent' disregard for Fourth Amendment rights."t 4 According to Justice Alito,
9 Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011).
98 Id. at 2423-24, 2434.
9 The first three good faith doctrines-announced in Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), Krull, 480
U.S. 340 (1987), and Evans, 514 U.S. I (1995)-suspended suppression when law enforcement
officers act in objectively reasonable reliance on constitutional errors of others. Davis was a much
more logical outgrowth of those rulings than Herring, which authorized the admission of evidence
when officers make Fourth Amendment mistakes and at least some officer conduct is objectively
unreasonable.
'* Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2429 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 920).
101 Id.
102 Id. (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 919).
103 Moreover, Justice Kagan enlisted in the revolutionary army, joining the majority opinion
without qualification.
'" Id. at 2427.
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"when the police act with an objectively 'reasonable good-faith belief that their
conduct is lawful or when their conduct involves only simple, 'isolated'
negligence, the "'deterrence rationale loses much of its force,"' and exclusion
cannot 'pay its way."'"0 5 The "acknowledged absence of police culpability"-the
fact that the searching officers "did not violate Davis's Fourth Amendment rights
deliberately, recklessly, or with gross negligence" and lack of any "'recurring or
systemic negligence"'-"doom[ed] Davis's [suppression] claim."l 06 Even if it had
been objectively unreasonable for officers to believe that the precedent authorizing
the search was constitutional, the evidence would have been admissible because
the exclusionary rule is neither a "strict-liability regime" nor an "' [i]solated,'
'nonrecurring' police negligence" regime. 0 7  In sum, Davis delivered an
unmistakable doctrinal message: the culpability threshold announced in Herring
was no passing fancy or trial balloon. It is a serious and demanding prerequisite
precluding suppression in the absence of a sufficiently blameworthy Fourth
Amendment violation by law enforcement. 0 8
Like Herring, and unlike Hudson, Davis contained little inflammatory
language. Justice Alito did accuse the exclusionary rule of, "in many cases, . . .
suppress[ing] the truth and set[ting] the criminal loose in the community without
punishment."'09 Moreover, he described it as a "bitter pill" that "society must
swallow . . . when necessary, but only as a 'last resort."'110 Otherwise, the
majority's rhetoric was quite temperate. Justice Alito's characterization of the
nature of the exclusionary rule, however, seems significant-and potentially
corrosive. After noting that the Fourth Amendment text makes no mention of
suppression, he described the "exclusionary rule ... [as] a 'prudential' doctrine ...
created by th[e] Court to 'compel respect for the constitutional guaranty.'""
Some early decisions had "suggested that the rule was a self-executing mandate
implicit in the Fourth Amendment," but the Court's later opinions had corrected
that misconception, "acknowledg[ing] the exclusionary rule for what it
undoubtedly is-a 'judicially created remedy' of th[e] Court's own making."ll 2
Moreover, this "'judicially created' sanction [is] specifically designed as a
105 Id. at 2428 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 919, 908, n.6 (quoting United States v. Peltier, 422
U.S. 531, 539 (1975))).
106 Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2428.
107 Id. at 2428-29 (quoting Herring, 555 U.S. at 137, 144 (2009)).
108 The endorsement of Herring's suffocating culpability requirement did not escape the notice
of the Justices who refised to join the majority opinion. See Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2435 (Sotomayor,
J., concurring in the judgment) (asserting that culpability "is not dispositive"); id. at 2439 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (objecting to the Court's placement of "determinative weight upon. . . culpability").
09 Id. at 2427 (majority opinion).
110 Id. (quoting Hudson, 547 U.S. at 591).
.. Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2426.
112 Id. at 2427.
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'windfall' remedy to deter future Fourth Amendment violations.""
Finally, the Davis majority endorsed an exceedingly restrictive understanding
of the exclusionary rule's objective. According to Justice Alito, the contention that
suppression was necessary in situations involving reliance on binding precedent to
prevent "stunt[ing] the development of Fourth Amendment law" could not be
"reconcile[d] with [the] modem understanding of the role of the exclusionary rule"
because "the sole purpose . . . is to deter misconduct by law enforcement."ll 4 The
Court rejected the "suggest[ion] that the exclusionary rule should be modified to
serve a purpose other than deterrence of culpable law-enforcement conduct."' 1 5
The Court, thus, made it clear that no other objective will inform the scope of the
suppression sanction. Moreover, the Court incorporated the culpability limitation
into the deterrent aim, indicating that the object is not to discourage all Fourth
Amendment violations, but only to prevent culpable constitutional transgressions.
This reconception of suppression's objective was an interesting, and clever, twist
on an old theme.
IV. THE PRESENT AND FUTURE OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT EXCLUSIONARY
RULE: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE ROBERTS REVOLUTION
Assessment of the significance of Davis requires an appreciation of both
Hudson and Herring. Unlike its predecessors, Davis offers little that is novel or
unpredictable. Its primary importance is confirmation and clarification of the
revolutionary path the Court intends to follow. This final section discusses that
path, analyzing critical facets and underpinnings, and ventures speculations about
exclusion's future.
A. The Erosive Contributions of Davis
Hudson signaled that the Roberts Court had the suppression sanction in its
crosshairs. The disdainful tone, hostile rhetoric, and anti-exclusionary rule
reasoning suggested a genuine possibility that the goal was abolition. Herring
confirmed the commitment to revolutionize the law, but took a distinctly different
approach. Instead of bludgeoning the Weeks-Mapp doctrine further, the Chief
Justice opted for a less confrontational style. There were no suggestions that
exclusion was a relic that had outlived its usefulness and only a sprinkling of
pejoratives. The majority could have relied upon either Hudson's attenuation or
cost-benefit basis for denying suppression," 6 but eschewed both doctrinal routes.
"' Id. at 2433-34.
114 Id. at 2432 (emphasis in original).
us Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2432-33 (emphasis added).
116 The Court could have applied attenuation by reasoning that suppression does not serve the
interests safeguarded by Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable seizures of persons-
liberty and dignity. Alternatively, the Justices could have reasoned that the costs of suppression for
this type of transgression outweigh any deterrent gains-relying on several of the premises that
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Instead, the Chief Justice acknowledged "core concerns" that justified an
evidentiary bar in some situations and prescribed a culpability criterion that
reflects those concerns and dramatically constricts the reach of the exclusionary
rule." 7
In tone, attitude, logic, and tactic, Davis is Herring's offspring. The first
three terms of the Roberts Court showed that there was more than one way to
"skin" an exclusionary "cat." Davis confirmed that, at least for now, the Justices
prefer the more respectful, seemingly more moderate, politically more palatable
strategy adopted in Herring."8 While preserving exclusion, the Herring-Davis
culpability threshold revolutionizes that remedy by restricting it to a very small
number of cases involving sufficiently blameworthy police misconduct. It does
not eliminate, or even presage elimination of, the exclusionary rule.
While it is distinctly less confrontational, the Herring-Davis route may prove
an even greater doctrinal threat to the vitality of the exclusionary rule than
Hudson's approach. Hudson carved three doctrinal holes with the potential to
erode suppression one case at a time. The Herring-Davis culpability requisite
threatens to stifle exclusionary rule enforcement of the Fourth Amendment
immediately by choking off the source of cases that presumptively trigger
suppression."'9 After Herring's announcement of a culpability threshold in dictum
supported by a five-Justice majority, it was possible the Court might reconsider, or
even ignore, that limitation in future cases. Davis powerfully affirms that an
augmented, six-Justice majority is committed to imposing this novel, and severe,
restriction upon the purview of suppression. Although technically Davis's
reaffirmation of the culpability demand may also be dictum, it is dead serious
dictum. There is no reason to doubt that the majority's unequivocal endorsement
of and reliance on that premise in Davis is controlling. The case could have been
resolved on the narrow ground that objectively reasonable reliance on judicial
mistakes justifies an exception to the exclusionary rule. Instead, the Court placed
equal (and inseparable) reliance on the ground that officers lacked the minimal
culpability required for suppression.
According to the Court, the exclusionary rule is designed to grant defendants
an evidentiary "windfall" for the limited purpose of deterring "culpable" law
enforcement violations of the guarantee against unreasonable searches and
seizures. It operates only when officers' unconstitutional actions are blameworthy
informed the balance in Hudson.
117 Hudson's abrasive approach attracted shaky support from a bare majority. Herring's
gentler strategy garnered unqualified support from five Justices, and, in Davis, attracted a sixth
Justice. The Chief Justice apparently subscribes to the maxim that one catches more flies with honey
than vinegar.
" This is not to suggest that Hudson is a dead letter or that the Court will not find it useful in
future cases. Moreover, the revolutionary spirit that animated Hudson's verbal assaults is alive and
well.
"' See Davis, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2438-40 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Herring, 555 U.S. at
156-57 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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enough. Simple, isolated negligence-objective unreasonableness-is insufficient
fault. Henceforth, the only Fourth Amendment transgressions that entitle
defendants with standing to claim suppression will be those in which defendants
prove deliberate, reckless, grossly negligent, or recurrently negligent conduct.120
The practical, concrete ramifications of this revolutionary development are
unmistakable. Suppose that officers erroneously believe, for example, that an
arrest or search warrant is valid, that a warrant authorizes the search of a particular
place, that there is a fair probability that a person committed an offense or that a
car contains contraband, that there is a reasonable suspicion of crime and danger,
or that a fleeing felon poses a danger of serious physical harm. If their errors were
merely careless--objectively unreasonable-the evidence they acquire is
admissible. Suppression follows only if it was grossly objectively unreasonable
for officers to believe that their search or seizure complied with the Fourth
Amendment. Constitutional violations will not trigger exclusion unless they are
flagrantly abusive or egregious-grossly divergent from constitutional norms-or
are careless and have been repeated often enough to demonstrate systemic
negligence. Surely this will be a minuscule category of cases. The supply of
Fourth Amendment violations justifying suppression will dwindle to a trickle.
Judicial involvement in the enforcement of that fundamental Bill of Rights
provision will inevitably wane.121
B. Reflection Upon and Speculation About Davis's Revolutionary Premises
According to Mapp v. Ohio, the exclusionary rule was "judicially implied,"
but "constitutionally required" as both an "essential ingredient" of the Fourth
Amendment and a necessary deterrent safeguard.122 The Burger Court launched its
campaign against exclusion by rejecting the constitutional right predicate, casting
the rule as primarily a deterrent device, characterizing it as a "judicially created
remedy," and purging assertions that it was "constitutionally required." 23 Herring
observed that the Fourth Amendment text did not bar evidence and affirmed that
the rule was "judicially created"-that is, "establish[ed]" by the Court's
"decisions."l24 Davis's reflections on the nature of exclusion subtly diminished its
stature further. Justice Alito reiterated that the Fourth Amendment "says nothing"
about evidentiary suppression, reaffirming that "the exclusionary rule . . . is a
120 It merits mention that the burden of proving culpability, like the burden of showing a
constitutional violation, standing, and but-for causation, falls on the defendant because sufficiently
blameworthy conduct is needed "to trigger" suppression. See Herring, 555 U.S. at 144. The burden
of establishing an "exception" to the exclusionary rule falls upon the government.
121 See Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2440 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
122 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 648, 651 (1961).
123 See, e.g., Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348 (1974) (emphasis added).
124 See Herring, 555 U.S. at 139.
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'prudential' doctrine . . . created by th[e] Court." 25  He disavowed the
.'[e]xpansive dicta . . . suggest[ing] that the rule was a self-executing mandate
implicit in the Fourth Amendment itself,"' and observed that the Court had already
"acknowledge[d] the exclusionary rule for what it undoubtedly is-a judicially-
created remedy' of th[e] Court's own making."126 Suppression is nothing more
than "a 'judicially created' sanction . . . specifically designed as a 'windfall'
remedy."1 27
These depictions of the source and character of the exclusionary rule seem
designed to promote the revolutionary cause by weakening its foundations even
further. The Supreme Court has no "supervisory 2 ower" over, and therefore
cannot impose mere rules of evidence on, the states.' Authority to compel states
to exclude evidence must be derived from the Constitution. Nonetheless, the Court
has deliberately refrained from describing the exclusionary rule as "constitutional"
in origin. Moreover, Davis deemed it misguided to suggest that this merely
"prudential" doctrine of the Court's "own making" was implicit in the Fourth
Amendment, which furnished no textual foundation.
The object of these increasingly stingier characterizations of suppression
could be to lay a foundation for outright abolition. Ultimately, the Court could
admit that in announcing and adhering to the exclusionary rule it exceeded its
constitutional authority, arrogating to itself an indefensible "creative" power. It
seems unlikely, however, that the Court will confess such fundamental error. It
seems somewhat more likely that the Justices might cite the weakened
underpinnings of the exclusionary rule as grounds for finding it replaceable. We
may learn that the exclusionary rule is cousin to Miranda, a product of the
constitutional authority to preserve Fourth Amendment rights by providing some
enforcement mechanism. Suppression may turn out to be a constitutionally
necessary sanction imposed in the absence of effective alternatives, not the
sanction required by the Fourth Amendment. If the Court perceives or devises an
effective replacement, Davis's conception of the exclusionary rule would not stand
in the way. For now, the prevailing understanding of the exclusionary rule's
nature will prevent any expansion and may well facilitate further contraction.129
Davis affirmed that the sole objective of exclusion is future-oriented
deterrence,130 and then further narrowed the "purpose" from deterrence of Fourth
125 See Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2426.
126 Id. at 2427 (emphasis added).
127 Id. at 2433-34.
128 See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428,438 (2000).
129 With a culpability threshold in place, there will not be many opportunities to erode
suppression further. One possibility that would seem to have majority support today is the overruling
of James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307 (1990), and a holding that the government may impeach defense
witnesses by introducing evidence obtained in culpable violation of the Fourth Amendment.
13o The majority kept open the possibility that the need "to prevent Fourth Amendment law
from becoming ossified" might justify permitting a defendant who succeeds in securing reversal of a
binding Supreme Court precedent to reap the "windfall" of suppression in his case. See Davis, 131 S.
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Amendment violations to "deterrence of culpable law-enforcement conduct."'' It
turns out that suppression is not designed to discourage all unreasonable searches
or seizures or even all that are deterrable.' 32 The goal is to discourage
constitutional deprivations involving sufficient official fault.
The Court found some precedential support for this narrower-than-ever focus
in the fact that the seminal exclusionary rule cases-Weeks, Silverthorne, and
Mapp-all involved abusive, flagrant, "patently unconstitutional" Fourth
Amendment wrongs.' 33  Culpable violations of this sort were, thus, "the core
concerns that led [the Court] to adopt the rule in the first place."l 34 In addition,
"the Leon line of cases," which is grounded in a "basic insight" concerning the
relationship between culpability and "the deterrence benefits of exclusion,"
supports restricting the exclusionary rule to culpable violations.' Moreover, "in
27 years of practice under Leon's good faith exception, [the Court had] 'never
applied' the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence obtained as a result of
nonculpable, innocent police conduct." 36 In other words, not only had the Court
adopted the exclusionary rule to respond to culpable violations, but its decisions
since 1984 reflected that same focus and concern.
I do not quibble with the Court's description of the precedents, but question
the lessons drawn. Weeks, Silverthorne, and Mapp did involve egregious
violations. However, it seems unfair to infer from the facts of those three cases
that the "core," indeed, the sole, "concerns" were not merely constitutional
violations, but blameworthy improprieties. At the time of those landmark
opinions, the Justices believed in a constitutional right to exclude illegally
obtained evidence, and none contains a hint that this personal right hinged on
official intention, flagrancy, abusiveness, or "patent" unconstitutionality.'37
Reliance on the facts of those cases as the basis for a fundamental doctrinal
restriction upon the constitutional entitlement they recognized seems strained and
disingenuous.38
The effort to draw support from "the Leon line" fares no better. Leon was
Ct. at 2433-34.
131 See id. at 2433.
132 See Herring, 555 U.S. at 144 n.4 (2009).
"3 See id. at 143-44.
134 id
'3s Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427; see Herring, 555 U.S. at 141-42.
136 Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2429 (quoting Herring, 555 U.S. at 144); see Herring, 555 U.S. at 144
(asserting that, since Leon, the Court had "never applied the rule to exclude evidence . .. where the
police conduct was no more intentional or culpable than" the "nonrecurring and attenuated
negligence" in Herring).
'n See supra text accompanying notes 31-32.
13 The reliance on Judge Friendly's view regarding the need for culpability is hardly
persuasive. See Herring, 555 U.S. at 143. The Court never accepted his effort to so confine
evidentiary suppression.
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decided after exclusion's demotion to the status of mere deterrent device. Its logic
did suggest that when officers have no fault-when it is objectively reasonable to
believe that they are acting constitutionally-deterrence cannot justify exclusion.
Until Herring, however, the Court's good faith rulings all required that officers be
"objectively reasonable.',139 The clear implication was that the exclusionary rule
was not a strict liability sanction, but that mere, isolated negligence justified
suppression that would remove incentives for official carelessness and promote
constitutional compliance. The Leon line furnishes no support for a general
culpability requirement greater than simple negligence.140
Finally, the absence of any post-Leon decision mandating suppression in a
case involving culpability no greater than isolated negligence provides no
precedential support for a higher threshold fault requirement. This lack of
precedent reflects the inconsequential fact that the question of whether negligent
violations trigger suppression did not reach the Court. Moreover, in light of the
indication in the good faith opinions that objective reasonableness was necessary
to avoid exclusion and that negligence was an appropriate target of deterrence, it is
not surprising that this issue did not arise.
The exceedingly strained readings of precedent would not be as troubling if
the Court had offered solid substantive justifications for its novel culpability
gatekeeper. The thin, sketchy quality of the explanations of the premises
underlying the general demand for culpability and the specific demand for more
than negligence only heighten suspicion about the merits of the Roberts revolution.
Perhaps the Justices recognized the weaknesses in their logic and thought it wiser
not to construct a larger target for critics of their unprecedented, and severe,
constriction of suppression's domain.
Herring tied the culpability requisite to the deterrent objective of suppression
and the cost-benefit balance that dictates exclusionary rule analysis. 14' According
to the Chief Justice, suppression "turns on the culpability of the police and the
potential of exclusion to deter wrongful police conduct."1 42 He asserted that "[t]he
extent to which the exclusionary rule is justified by . .. deterrence principles varies
with the culpability of the law enforcement conduct" 43 and explained that "[t]o
trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that
exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence
"' See Evans, 514 U.S. at 16; Krull, 480 U.S. at 356-57; Sheppard, 468 U.S. at 987-88; Leon,
468 U.S. at 922.
140 Of course, neither Leon nor its progeny had held that a mere lack of negligence precluded
suppression. The pre-Herring good faith decisions had also required sources of error outside law
enforcement. The absence of culpability that justified admitting evidence had two components-no
error at all by law enforcement and no negligence by officers who relied on another's error. Before
Herring, it was possible that suppression might be appropriate in cases involving objectively
reasonable beliefs by officers responsible for Fourth Amendment errors.
141 See Herring, 555 U.S. at 143-46.
142 Id. at 137.
143 Id. at 143.
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is worth the price paid by the justice system."'" In defending the demand for
more than isolated negligence, the Chief Justice acknowledged that sanctions,
including exclusion, can deter negligent conduct but concluded that any deterrent
benefits suppression yields in cases of negligence are "not worth the cost."1 4 5 The
substantial social costs of barring the evidentiary products of isolated negligence
outweigh any gains in preventing future unconstitutionalities.146 The "claim that
police negligence automatically triggers suppression cannot be squared with
principles underlying the exclusionary rule," because "any marginal deterrence"
that would result cannot 'pay its way."'l 47 At a minimum, "systemic error or
reckless disregard of constitutional requirements" is necessary to tip the balance in
favor of suppression.148
Davis endorsed this reasoning.149 According to Justice Alito, "the deterrent
value of exclusion is strong and tends to outweigh the resulting costs" when
officers engage in 'deliberate,' 'reckless,' or 'grossly negligent' disregard for
Fourth Amendment rights."5 o When conduct is objectively reasonable or involves
"only simple, 'isolated' negligence," the deterrent benefits are less substantial and
are insufficient to justify the social costs.' 5' "[T]he harsh sanction of exclusion" is
appropriate "only when" officers' unreasonable searches and seizures "are
deliberate enough to yield 'meaningfu[l]' deterrence, and culpable enough to be
'worth the price paid by the judicial system." 52
One apparent premise is that officers who are more than negligent are more
likely to care about and be attuned to the loss of evidence and to respond by
modifying their unconstitutional conduct. Officers whose only fault is an
objectively unreasonable belief that their acts are constitutional-those who are
merely careless and should know better-are not very likely to respond to the
threat of suppression either because they will not foresee or do not care about that
consequence. For these reasons, the deterrent value of suppression for mere
negligence is less weighty.
Another underlying premise is that barring the truth from a criminal trial is an
unjustifiably disproportionate sanction for isolated negligence-i.e., an undeserved
penalty for conduct that is minimally blameworthy. Occasional carelessness is
hardly abnormal, and officers whose only failing is negligence are hardly "culpable
144 Id. at 144.
145 Id. at 144 n.4.
146 The description of the cost-benefit balance was less extensive in Herring than in other
significant exclusionary rule opinions.
147 Herring, 555 U.S. at 147-48.
14s Id. at 147.
149 See Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427-28.
"s Id. at 2427 (quoting Herring, 555 U.S. at 144).
"s' Id. at 2427-28 (quoting Herring, 555 U.S. at 137).
152 Id. at 2428 (quoting Herring, 555 U.S. at 144).
400 [Vol 9:1
THE EXCLUSION REVOLUTION CONTINUES
enough" to be "'[p]enaliz[ed]"' by the "harsh sanction of exclusion." 53 In sum,
the exclusionary rule's punitive consequences for officers, for the judicial system,
and, indeed, for society are unjustifiable absent sufficient fault. Without sufficient
moral blameworthiness, suppression is not "'worth the price paid."'l
54
As usual, the Court's assessment of the costs and benefits of suppression for
negligent Fourth Amendment violations was not based on measurable, empirical
evidence. Instead, it rests on debatable assumptions about human nature and the
effects of exclusion. Tort law posits that careless individuals are capable of
foreseeing and inclined to respond to undesired legal consequences, that is, that
sanctions will reduce the incidence of negligent conduct. 55 Moreover, the view
that officers who are merely negligent are, by nature, likely to care more about
successful prosecution and more likely to respond to exclusion by exercising
ordinary care is hardly implausible. Negligent officers might, in fact, be less
resistant to deterrent sanctions than those with greater fault. Finally, it seems fair
to conclude that a high percentage of unreasonable searches and seizures will
involve isolated negligence and that greater culpability will be rare.' 56 If so, then
suppression will yield substantial cumulative gains in Fourth Amendment
enforcement.'5 1 Contrary to the conclusion of the revolutionaries, the benefits of
suppression for nonrecurrent negligence may well be worth the price paid.
The contention that exclusion is an unjustified and disproportionate penalty
for merely negligent conduct rests on a distortion of the exclusionary rule's very
nature. Evidentiary suppression has never been punitive in character, analogous to
sentences imposed for crimes.'58 Deterrence results from removing incentives for
future illegalities-i.e., depriving the government of illegally obtained advantages.
The object is not to make officers suffer a penalty for blameworthy acts.
Because the exclusionary rule is not a punitive sanction, it seems misguided, at
best, and misleading, at worst, to suggest that suppression for mere negligence is
unacceptable because it penalizes officers more than they deserve. The
proportionality premise that underlies the revolution is fundamentally flawed,
discordant with the long-prevailing conception of how suppression deters
unconstitutional acts.
The theoretical bases offered to support the culpability demand seem thin,
questionable, and flawed-hardly sufficient to justify the revolutionary
constriction of suppression's territory. But what of the unspoken premises?
"' Id. at 2428-29 (quoting Krull, 480 U.S. at 350).
154 Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2428 (quoting Herring, 555 U.S. at 144).
15s See Herring, 555 U.S. at 153 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
156 See Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2439-40 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
157 See id. at 2440 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the culpability requirement will
result in a substantial loss of Fourth Amendment rights).
1ss See id. at 2438 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
159 If it were punitive, the principle that suppression must not put officers in a worse
evidentiary position would be questionable. See Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 542 (1988).
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Neither Herring nor Davis questioned the legitimacy of the Weeks-Mapp doctrine.
Yet neither disavowed the challenges posed by Hudson or the assumptions
supporting those challenges. It seems entirely likely that some, if not all, of the
Justices who endorsed the less confrontational, more temperate approach of
Herring-Davis were motivated by the exclusionary rule animus that permeated
Hudson. Both opinions repeated Hudson's characterization of suppression as a
"last resort," and Davis described it as a "bitter pill." 60 Like Hudson's novel
doctrinal twists, the culpability threshold reflects a sense that the exclusionary rule
is more trouble than it's worth, has largely outlived its usefulness, and is no longer
needed to ensure adequate enforcement of the Fourth Amendment. Although not
explicit in Herring or Davis, assumptions about increased law enforcement
professionalism and the availability and effectiveness of alternative remedies
probably played roles. Moreover, the Justices may well doubt the efficacy of
suppression-i.e., whether future courtroom losses really do motivate
investigators. It seems clear that they do not fear that imposing the greater-than-
negligence culpability demand will open the floodgates of Fourth Amendment
carelessness.
It is difficult to believe that the Justices are unaware of how severely the
Herring-Davis doctrine curtails the exclusionary rule's reach. Under a culpability
regime, suppression will be the exception, not the norm, for evidence gained from
unreasonable searches and seizures. The Roberts revolution must rest on an
assessment of practical realities and a conclusion that the rarity of exclusion will
inflict little constitutional harm and produce substantial social benefit.
Assuming that the exclusion of evidence is a deterrent enforcement
mechanism and not a constitutional right,161 reliance on real-world consequences,
impacts, and needs seems not only appropriate, but also commendable. The
premises that support the culpability doctrine may reflect an accurate, eminently
realistic evaluation of the need for the suppression remedy today. The fault
demand may be grounded in defensible inferences and conclusions about the
consequences of dramatically curtailing exclusion. It is troubling, however, that
the Justices are unwilling to express and embrace the premises that undergird their
revolution, that they refuse to be open and honest about the pragmatic assessments
that have led to the conclusion that radical reform is justified.
I have fundamental disagreements with most aspects of the majority opinion
in Hudson v. Michigan. At the time it was handed down, I thought it had little, if
any, redeeming value. After Herring and Davis, I have changed my mind. Justice
Scalia's confrontational and much more transparent approach, his willingness to
express the anti-Mapp premises that animated the decision, seems far preferable to
the. silence and stealth of the later opinions. The failure to acknowledge, explain,
and defend the premises, assumptions, and understanding of realities that have
160 See Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427; Herring, 555 U.S. at 140.
161 It is certainly arguable that the Court erred when it abandoned the premise that exclusion is
a constitutional right. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 935-44 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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been instrumental in the Court's adoption of the culpability limitation, and the
refusal to respond persuasively to competing assumptions and understandings,
impede productive debate and raise serious doubts about the legitimacy of the
ongoing revolution.
V. CONCLUSION
For now, formal abolition of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule seems
unlikely. At least five Justices seem to believe that it should survive-if only in
theory. Moreover, those who would overthrow the suppression doctrine surely
understand that with the culpability threshold in place society will seldom have to
swallow the "bitter pill." The rule will impose few costs, rarely impede the truth,
and bestow only occasional windfalls on guilty criminals.
Davis v. United States confirms that the Court is committed to revolutionary
curtailment of the suppression remedy and that the culpability threshold is the
preferred vehicle for affecting that revolution. The revolutionaries believe that
evidentiary exclusion is rarely necessary or justifiable. They have implemented
that belief by installing a very fine doctrinal filter for suppression claims, a screen
that allows only sufficiently blameworthy constitutional violations to pass. This
radical reform of the exclusionary rule rests on implicit confidence in law
enforcement, a sense that a generous suppression doctrine is unnecessary, and a
belief that privacy and liberty can be preserved without freeing guilty, dangerous
criminals. Those who care about the Fourth Amendment-a nation-defining Bill
of Rights provision that grants a "right" not to criminals, but to all of "the
people"-can only hope that this confidence is well-placed, that this sense is
accurate, and that this belief is prescient.
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